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ABSTRACT
Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are integrated circuits
that implement reconfigurable hardware. They are used in modern
systems, creating specialized, highly-optimized integrated circuits
without the need to design and manufacture dedicated chips. As the
capacity of FPGAs grows, it is increasingly common for designers
to incorporate implementations of algorithms and protocols from
a range of third-party sources. The monolithic nature of FPGAs
means that all on-chip circuits, including third party black-box de-
signs, must share common on-chip infrastructure, such as routing
resources. In this paper, we observe that a “long” routing wire carry-
ing a logical 1 reduces the propagation delay of other adjacent but
unconnected long wires in the FPGA interconnect, thereby leaking
information about its state. We exploit this effect and propose a
communication channel that can be used for both covert transmis-
sions between circuits, and for exfiltration of secrets from the chip.
We show that the effect is measurable for both static and dynamic
signals, and that it can be detected using very small on-board cir-
cuits. In our prototype, we are able to correctly infer the logical
state of an adjacent long wire over 99% of the time, even without
error correction, and for signals that are maintained for as little as
82us. Using a Manchester encoding scheme, our channel bandwidth
is as high as 6kbps. We characterize the channel in detail and show
that it is measurable even when multiple competing circuits are
present and can be replicated on different generations and families
of Xilinx devices (Virtex 5, Virtex 6, and Artix 7). Finally, we pro-
pose countermeasures that can be deployed by systems and tools
designers to reduce the impact of this information leakage.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The ever-increasing size and sophistication of FPGAs make them
an ideal platform for System-on-Chip integration. FPGAs are often
used in high-bandwidth, low-latency applications, providing func-
tionality such as network card replacement, or massively parallel
computation. Besides permeating distributed systems and critical
infrastructure, FPGA chips are also integrated in end-products, rang-
ing from consumer electronics to medical and scientific equipment.
As a result, protecting their security is a necessary step to ensure
that their computations are performed in a trustworthy manner.
The high cost of design and development has led to an increase
in outsourcing, making it common to have designs from different
contractors on the same FPGA chip. Such designs often include
protocol and data structure implementations, or more sophisticated
circuits, like radio front-ends or soft processors. This practice raises
concerns about the malicious inclusion of circuits (cores) that have
additional backdoor functionality. The cores can be functionally
validated before being included in the overall design, but such static
analysis cannot always detect covert channels [10]. It is therefore
important to identify and protect against such channels.
In this paper, we show that the value driven onto certain types
of FPGA routing resources, called “long” wires, influences the delay
of nearby wires, even when the driven value remains constant. This
distinguishes our approach from prior work which depends on
fast-changing signals [8, 12, 35], and thus local voltage drops or
inductive crosstalk. Specifically, we find that if a long wire carries a
logical 1, the delay of nearby long lines will be slightly lower than
when it carries a logical 0. This difference in delay allows cores
sharing the same reconfigurable FPGA fabric to communicate, even
when they are not directly connected.
We demonstrate the phenomenon by building a transmitter and
receiver, which are unconnected, and only use adjacent long wires
to communicate. The receiver is a three-stage Ring Oscillator (RO),
whose routing uses a long wire between two of its stages. The
transmitter drives a long wire adjacent to that of the RO. When the
transmitting wire carries a logical 1, the routing delay of the RO
longwire decreases, thereby increasing the RO frequency.We detect
these minor frequency changes by counting the number of the RO
signal transitions during a fixed time interval. This mechanism can
be used either for covert communication, or for the exfiltration of
fast-changing dynamic signals.
We conduct extensive experiments on three Xilinx FPGA families
and show that the phenomenon is independent of the device used,
the location and orientation of the transmitter and receiver, and the
pattern of transmission. We perform all tests on stock prototyping
boards without modifications, and show that the phenomenon can
be detected even in the presence of environmental noise and with
only small circuits internal to the FPGA. Finally, we propose new
defense mechanisms which can be implemented by systems and
tools designers to reduce the impact of this information leakage.
2 BACKGROUND
Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are integrated circuits
that implement reconfigurable hardware. At a basic level, they
consist of blocks of configurable lookup tables (LUTs), which can
be used to represent the truth table of combinatorial functions. They
also include registers to store data, as well as programmable routing,
which determines how the LUTs and registers are interconnected.
FPGAs can thus be used to represent all computable functions,
including emulating sophisticated circuits such as entire CPUs.
The Xilinx FPGAs used in our experiments internally have a grid
layout, whose fundamental building block is called a Configurable
Logic Block (CLB). It is composed of two slices, each of which con-
tains four LUTs and registers. Each CLB has an associated switch
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matrix, which contains resources to connect elements within a
CLB, and enables CLBs to communicate with each other. There are
multiple types of such communication wires, which have different
orientations and lengths. In this paper we focus on a specific type
of routing resource, called a long. Longs are a wire type used to
efficiently communicate between CLBs that are far apart, and can
be vertical (connecting elements with the same x coordinate), or
horizontal (same y coordinate). We have observed the phenomenon
in both types of wires, but for brevity we limit our discussion to
vertical longs, or VLONGs. Due to the FPGA’s routing topology, ad-
ditional shorter wires are often needed to connect certain elements
via long wires. We will refer to these wires as “local routing”.
Usually, the details of how logic elements are placed and signals
are routed are transparent to the circuit designers. Designers define
their desired logic, but the conversion to a physical implementation
is handled by the manufacturer tools. Compiler directives for the
manual routing of signals are available, but these are often only used
if the exact routing impacts functionality. In the absence of manual
directives, the tools may elect to use any wire, including longs, to
carry a given signal in the circuit, without alerting designers.
That said, user-designed circuits often share the FPGAwith third-
party implementations of various protocols, data structures, and
algorithms. These licensed designs, called Intellectual Property (IP)
cores or blocks, often come in a pre-routed black-box format, to
eliminate the variability of on-the-fly routing and attain a known
clock frequency. As a result, the routing of these blocks is opaque
to circuit designers, and blocks created by different parties can use
routing resources in the same channel of long wires. As our paper
shows, this use of nearby long wires can enable malicious circuits
to communicate covertly, or extract information from other cores.
Ring Oscillators (ROs) are a type of circuit which consists of an
odd number of NOT gates, chained together in a ring formation
(i.e., the output of the last gate is fed back as input to the first
gate). ROs form a bi-stable loop, whose output oscillates between 1
and 0 (true and false). The frequency of oscillation depends on the
number of stages in the RO, the delay between the stages, as well
as voltage, temperature, and small variations in the manufacturing
process [9]. ROs in FPGAs are used as temperature monitors [36],
True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) [33], and Physically-
Unclonable Functions (PUFs)s [20], while in this paper we present
a way to use them to detect the logic state of nearby wires.
3 SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
FPGA designs contain IP cores sourced from third-parties, and some
of these cores may contain unwanted functionality, as shown in
Figure 1. These third-party IP cores can be distributed as fully-
specified, pre-placed and pre-routed elements (“macros”) to meet
timing constraints (e.g., DDR controllers) and reduce compilation
time, with the macro repositioned at specific intervals where the
logic and routing fabric is self-similar [13, 15–17].
As FPGAs often process highly-sensitive information (e.g., cryp-
tographic keys), it is essential to ensure that data does not leak to
unauthorized third-parties. In this paper, we focus on malicious IP
cores which aim to infer information about the state of nearby (but
physically-unconnected) logic. The adversary can thus insert one
or more IP cores into the design, but these cores are not directly
Figure 1: System model. Different IP cores share common
FPGA routing resources. The cores can be supplied by differ-
ent contractors and may contain malicious functionality.
connected. The adversary can also define the internal placement
and routing of his own blocks and force his cores to use specific
routing resources that can compromise the integrity of a reverse-
engineered target IP block. Note that directly connecting to the
target IP block would result in a logical error in the compilation
flow, but merely using adjacent wires does not raise such errors. We
discuss how the adversary can accomplish his goals in Section 3.2.
The adversary does not have physical access to the board, and can
thus not alter the environmental conditions or physically modify
the FPGA board in any way. There is also no temperature control
beyond the standard heatsink and fan already mounted on the
FPGA, andwe do not add any special voltage regulation, or shielding
to the chip or the connected wires. Such modifications reduce noise
and improve the stability of measurements [18, 23, 31, 36], and
would thus make it easier for the adversary to achieve his goals.
In this paper, we show that by using long wires, an adversary
can infer the nearby state of blocks he does not control, or establish
covert communication between two co-operating IP cores under his
control, even in the presence of power and temperature fluctuations.
We provide further motivation and applications of the capabilities
offered by this new source of information leakage in Section 3.1.
3.1 Motivation
With increased outsourcing, Hardware Trojans (HTs) have become
a common-place security threat for FPGAs [7, 32]. Adversarial IP
cores can thus eavesdrop on nearby cores and attempt to extract
information about their state. As designs are often tested to detect
HTs and other security threats [12, 18, 35], we thus assume that
the IP cores provide legitimate functionality that is needed by the
user, and that they do not contain additional logic which would
make them easy to detect. Indeed, the transmitter and receiver
we present have dual use, hiding their malicious functionality in
their routing, not their actual combinatorial and sequential logic.
As a result, unlike conventional backdoors, our IP cores would
pass timing/netlist/bitfile verification, since they do not require
additional gates, presenting a bigger challenge to designers.
Multi-user setups present further threats beyond amalicious core
eavesdropping on signals not under the adversary’s control. Intel
Xeon and other CPUs with integrated FPGAs bring FPGAs closer to
a traditional server model, while FPGAs in cloud environments (e.g.,
Amazon EC2 F1 instances) are also becoming increasingly available.
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Although these are currently allocated on a per-user basis, we
can expect that they will eventually become sharable commodity
resources, since FPGAs already allow for partial reconfiguration,
and designs exist where different processors have access to and can
re-configure the same FPGA chip [29].
An additional threat arises when IP cores of different security
guarantees are integrated on the same design [10, 11, 28]. For exam-
ple, an adversary implementing the FM radio core on a phone SoC
would want to eavesdrop on the Trusted Platform Module’s (TPM)
AES encryption operations to recover its key. As sensitive cores
are highly scrutinized, an adversary who has also implemented the
TPM would want to establish a covert channel to transfer the key
using an inconspicuous transmitter.
Finally, the same phenomenon can be exploited to watermark
circuits [5, 27], or introduce a no-contact debugging mechanism,
for instance to detect stuck signals, without altering routing.
3.2 Influencing Placement and Routing
A potential issue with pre-placed and pre-routed IP cores is that
they are specific to an FPGA generation (but can be used in dif-
ferent devices within the same family). As we show in Section 7.2,
however, the phenomenon we present persists across 3 generations
of Xilinx chips. As a result, an adversary can provide an IP gener-
ation wizard that provides different routing for different families,
and dynamically choose the placement of the IP cores. In fact, as
we show in Section 8, the location of the actual logic and wires is
not important, so the adversary merely needs to ensure that the
transmitter and the receiver use long wires which are adjacent.
If the adversary only pre-routes but does not pre-place his cores,
he can still succeed, even if he leaves the absolute placement of
his cores to the routing tools. Assume the FPGA has N long wires,
the transmitted signal can be recovered fromw nearby wires, the
receiver uses R longs, and the transmitter uses T longs. Then, the
probability that at least one segment of the transmitter is adjacent
to a segment of the receiver is (R + T − 1) · w/N , assuming the
tools place the two cores at random. For the FPGA boards we have
used, N ≈ 8, 500 (equal to the number of CLBs) andw = 4, so with
R = T = 5, an adversary has a 0.42% chance of success. Since tools
do not pick locations at random or spread the logic, the probability
of success is higher in practice. The adversary can also increase this
probability by accessing relatively unique elements such as Block
RAM (BRAM), DSP blocks, or embedded processors on the FPGA
fabric. For example, the devices we used have less than 150 DSP
slices and 300 BRAM blocks, so accessing them reduces the number
of possible placements for the attacker’s cores.
A more powerful adversary can instead subvert the compilation
tools themselves, which is a common threat model for FPGAs [10,
14]. Note that, as before, since the final netlist itself is often veri-
fied post-synthesis and -routing, the adversary still does not desire
to include additional logic in the design, but just affect the rout-
ing/placement of his malicious cores. Finally, in co-located multi-
user instances, the adversary is the user, so he can always choose
the location of his own cores, without the need to rely on the above.
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Figure 2: Ring oscillator counts and 99% confidence intervals
for a setup where transmitter and receiver use 5 longs each.
The receiver is able to distinguish between signals using a
simple threshold, despite noise from the environment.
4 CHANNEL OVERVIEW
Our channel exploits the fact that the delay of long wires depends
on the logical state of nearby wires, even when the signals they are
carrying are static. We find that when the transmitting wire carries
a 1, the delay of the nearby receiving wire is lower, which results
in a higher number of ring oscillator (RO) counts. This is a distinct
mechanism from prior research, which depends on the switching
activity of nearby circuits, which decreases RO frequency [12, 35],
as we also independently verify in Section 6.3.
This dependence on the logical state of the transmitter is shown
in Figure 2. The red dots and blue x’s are RO counts when the
transmitter wire carries a logical 1 or 0 respectively. The difference
between the counts when transmitting 1s and 0s is clear, even under
local fluctuations due to environmental and other conditions: even
when the absolute frequencies of the ring oscillator change, the
difference between the two frequencies remains the same.
In order to characterize the efficacy and quality of the communi-
cation channel in detail, we perform a number of experiments, the
setup of which is detailed in Section 5. We first show in Section 6
that the strength of the effect does not depend on the transmission
pattern, by measuring the effect of an alternating sequence of 0s and
1s, as well as that of long runs of 0s and 1s, and of pseudo-random
bits. We illustrate that even for fast-changing dynamic signals, an
eavesdropping attacker can obtain the fraction of 1s and 0s, i.e., the
Hamming weight on the transmitting wire.
We then show that longer measurement periods and overlaps
make it easier to distinguish between different bits in Section 7. The
strength of the effect changes based on the receiver and transmitter
lengths, and this dependence exists across generations of devices,
but with a different magnitude. We also demonstrate that the abso-
lute location and orientation of the transmitter and receiver do not
change the magnitude of the effect in Section 8.
Finally, we show in Section 9 that the channel remains strong,
even if significant computation is happening elsewhere on the de-
vice simultaneously, showing that the channel can be used in a
realistic environment. We demonstrate that for the transmitted
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X
Figure 3: Experimental setup. Transmitter and receiver use
long wires to communicate, while the measurement setup
generates signals and measures their effects.
information to be detectable, the transmitter and receiver wires
need to be adjacent, but where exactly and in what direction the
overlap occurs is not significant. This indicates that it may be dif-
ficult for designers to protect themselves from eavesdropping, or
detect intentional malicious transmissions.
Overall, we show that the channel is stable across FPGA gen-
erations, devices, and locations within a device. It is also high-
bandwidth, and can be used to implement both covert communi-
cations and eavesdropping attacks, without tapping into existing
signals, and with minimal resources, as we explain in Section 10.
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In order to test the properties identified in Section 4, we need to
determine the factors we wish to vary, keeping the rest of the setup
fixed. This distinction naturally divides our experimental setup into
two parts, as shown in Figure 3. The communication channel circuit
contains just the transmitter and the Ring Oscillator receiver. The
measurement half works independently of any specific channel
implementation, generating the transmitted signal, sampling the
RO counter, and transferring the data to a PC for analysis.
The bulk of our experiments are conducted on three Virtex 5
XUPV5-LX110T (ML509) evaluations boards. The boards include a
heatsink and a fan, but we do not otherwise control for temperature,
and we also do not modify the board in any way (e.g., by bypassing
the voltage regulator) in accordance with our threat model. Each
experiment is run on every device 5 times, collecting 2048 data
points per run, and results are reported at the 99% confidence level.
5.1 Transmitter and Receiver
To illustrate the information leakage, our setup employs a minimal
transmitting circuit: the transmitter consists of a buffer LUT that
drives one or more long-wire segments connected end-to-end. We
use the term transmitter for brevity and because in the controlled
experiments we choose the value on the long wire, but the conclu-
sions we draw are valid whether transmissions are intentional or
not. The receiving circuit also uses long wires that are adjacent to
the transmitter’s wire segments. To measure the delay of the re-
ceiver’s long wire segment(s), we include it as part of a three-stage
ring oscillator. As in [31], the oscillator contains one inverter (NOT
gate) and two buffer stages. The wire’s delay directly influences the
frequency of oscillation, which we estimate by feeding the output
of one of the RO stages to a counter in our measurement setup.
The receiver and the transmitter are initially on fixed locations
of the device, but we change the location in Section 8 to show that it
does not influence our measurements. We also change their lengths
in Section 7.2 to show that the effect becomes more pronounced
the longer the overlap is.
5.2 Measurement Setup
The measurement component generates the signals to be transmit-
ted andmeasures the RO frequency. A new trigger event is produced
every N = 2n clock ticks. At every trigger, the RO counter is read
and reset, and a new value is presented to the transmitter. For most
experiments, the signal generator simply alternates between 0s
and 1s, but we change the pattern in Section 6 to show the general-
ity of the channel.
The 100MHz system clock is driven by a Digital Clock Manager
(DCM) to ensure clock quality. For the majority of our experiments,
we fix n = 21 (corresponding to 221 clock ticks, or 21ms), but vary
n in Section 7.1 to explore the accuracy vs. time trade-offs. The
sampled data is transferred to a PC for analysis through Xilinx’s
ChipScope Integrated Logic Analyzer (ILA) core.
Unlike the circuit described above, the measurement logic is not
hand-placed or hand-routed, due to the large number of experi-
ments performed. Although the measurement logic could influence
the RO frequency [22], we repeat our experiments on multiple
locations, control for other patterns, and average over relatively
lengthy periods of time. Thus, we believe that any effects of the
measurement circuitry would influence the transmission of both
zeros and ones equally, a hypothesis we confirm in Section 9 by
observing that the channel is only affected by adjacent wires.
5.3 Relative Count Difference
When a clock of frequency fCLK is sampled everym ticks and a
ring oscillator of frequency fRO driving a counter measures c ticks,
then fRO /fCLK ≈ c/m, with an appropriate quantization error due
to the unsynchronized nature of the RO and the system clock. Thus,
f 1RO − f 0RO
f 1RO
≈ C
1 −C0
C1
(1)
where Ci and f i represent the count and respective frequency
when the transmitter has value i . As a result, the relative change
of frequency can be approximated just by the measured counts,
irrespective of the measurement and clock periods.
In the basic setup, the transmitter alternates between sending
zeros and ones. We denote the i-th sampled count as ci , so the
pair pi = (ci , ci−1) always corresponds to different transmitted
values. For the sake of notation clarity, we will assume that c2i+1
corresponds to a transmitted 1 and we will be using the quantity
∆RCi =
c2i+1 − c2i
c2i+1
to indicate the relative frequency change between a transmitted one
and zero. ∆RC will denote the average of ∆RCi over all measure-
ment pairs i . We discuss different transmission patterns in Section 6
and how to exploit the measurements in Section 10.
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Figure 4: Timing diagram for the various transmission patterns used in the experiments. We test patterns which remain
constant within a measurement period (Alternatinд, Lonд Runs, Random), and fast-changing patterns (Dynamic).
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Figure 5: Effect of different static transmission patterns: (a) is a visualization of three different patterns: Alternatinд (left),
Lonд Runs (middle), and Random (right). (b) is a comparison across devices, with 99% confidence intervals. The magnitude of the
effect does not depend on the pattern used.
6 TRANSMITTER PATTERNS
In this section we show that the phenomenon observed does not
fundamentally depend upon the pattern of transmissions, i.e., that
only the values carried by the wire during the period of measure-
ment matter, and not the values that precede or follow it. We first
show this for relatively constant signals (Section 6.1), and then
for highly dynamic ones (Section 6.2). Finally, we compare our re-
sults to those produced by switching activity, which is traditionally
discussed in the context of Hardware Trojan detection (Section 6.3).
6.1 Constant Signals
In the default setup, we use a slowly alternating signal, where the
transmitted value changes every sampling period. This pattern is
denoted by Alternatinд in Figure 4. In this experiment, the trans-
mitted value still remains constant within a given measurement
period, and we sample the ring oscillator at the same default rate
(every 21ms), but change how the signal generator chooses the next
value to be transmitted. The first additional pattern we test greatly
slows down the alternation speed of the transmitted signal. This
Lonд Runs pattern maintains the same value for 128 consecutive
triggers—in essence, testing the effects of long sequences of zeros
and ones. The second setup employs a Linear Feedback Shift Reg-
ister, which produces a pseudo-random pattern of zeros and ones,
and is denoted by Random in Figure 4.
The results of this test are shown in Figure 5, with a sample of
the data in Figure 5a, and a comparison across devices in Figure 5b.
The RO counts remain significantly higher when transmitting a
1 versus a 0, and the average count difference remains identical,
with almost no variability among the patterns. We deduce that the
pattern of transmission has no persistent effect on the delay of
nearby wires, allowing the channel to be used without having to
ensure a balanced distribution of transmitted values.
6.2 Dynamic Patterns
To show that the dominating factor in the observed phenomenon
is the duration for which the transmitter remains at a logical 1, and
not the switching activity of the circuit, we try various dynamic
patterns. As a result, even if a signal is not sufficiently long-lived,
the attacker can still deduce the signal’s Hamming Weight (HW),
and thus eavesdrop on signals he does not control. We explain in
Section 10.2 how to use this property to recover cryptographic keys
through repeated measurements.
The dynamic patterns used are denoted byDynamic in the timing
diagram of Figure 4. During each sampling period, we loop the
transmitter quickly through a 4-bit pattern at 100MHz. We test
six different 4-bit patterns, only updating the looped pattern at
each new sampling period. For example, for the pattern 1100 (d2 in
Figure 4), the transmitter would stay high for two 100 MHz clock
ticks, then low for two clock ticks, then back to high for 2 ticks, etc.,
until the end of the sampling period. The six 4-bit patterns used
are: d0 = 0000, d1 = 1000, d2 = 1100, d3 = 1010, d4 = 1110, and
d5 = 1111. These patterns respectively have a HW of 0, 25, 50, 50,
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Dynamic Patterns (Long Wire Transmitter)
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Figure 6: Effect of dynamic switching activity using a long-
wire transmitter. RO counts increase with the Hamming
Weight, but not with the switching frequency.
75, and 100%, while their switching frequencies are 0, f = fCLK /8,
f , 2f , f , and 0 respectively.
Figure 6 shows the average count Ci of the ring oscillator for
each of pattern di . We see that the RO frequency increases with the
HammingWeight, so thatC0 < C1 < C2 ≈ C3 < C4 < C5. However,
the frequency is otherwise unaffected by the switching transmission
activity: the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggests that there is no
statistically significant difference between the two distributions
for d2 and d3. Note that the receiver would not able to distinguish
between patterns d2 and d3 as a result (or more generally, any
patterns with the same Hamming Weight), but we explain how to
overcome this limitation in Section 10.2.
6.3 Local Routing
In this section, we show that when the two circuits do not have
overlapping long wires, switching activity decreases the oscillation
frequency of the RO. This reproduces the results reported by prior
research on Hardware Trojan detection [12, 35] and also allows us
to sanity-check our measurement setup. To test this dependence on
the long wire overlap, we remove the transmitter using long wires,
and replace it with a buffer of 312 consecutive LUTs packed into
39 CLBs, using only local intra- and inter-CLB routing. We then
drive the same 6 dynamic patterns from Section 6.2 through the
buffer, and measure the results in Figure 7. We can clearly see that
the ordering of the patterns exactly mirrors their relative switching
activity, with the RO countsCi corresponding to di decreasing with
increased switching activity: C3 < C1 ≈ C2 ≈ C4 < C0 < C5. The
difference between the patterns with the same switching activity
d1, d2, d4 is not significant according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test, but the count is slightly higher for d5 compared to d0, which
have no switching activity. This suggests that the phenomenon we
have identified and which reduces delay may be present for shorter
wires as well, but is considerably weaker, and requires much bigger
circuits. Overall, we can conclude that when the transmitter does
not use longs which overlap with the receiver and generates a lot
of switching activity through multiple redundant buffers, then the
observed RO frequency is indeed reduced, reproducing the results
of prior work.
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Figure 7: Effect of dynamic switching activity without long-
wire overlaps. RO counts decreasewith switching frequency,
and are almost unaffected by the Hamming Weight.
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Figure 8: Absolute and relative count differences and 99%
confidence intervals for various measurement times. For a
given transmitter and receiver overlap, the absolute magni-
tude of the effect increases linearly with time.
7 MEASUREMENT PARAMETERS
In this section, we discuss the trade-offs between the quality of
the channel and the measurement time (Section 7.1), and length of
overlap between receiver and transmitter (Section 7.2).
7.1 Measurement Time
In this experiment, we return to the alternating pattern shown in
Figure 4, and vary the measurement time by repeatedly quadru-
pling it. Both the absolute and the relative count difference for
the various times are shown in Figure 8. In the top of the figure,
we see that the absolute count difference ∆C grows linearly with
increasing measurement time. Hence, the RO count differences can
be amplified, proportionally to the duration of the measurement.
The relative differences ∆RC (shown in the bottom of Figure 8)
remain approximately constant for measurement periods above
1ms, in accordance with our theoretical prediction of Equation (1).
The values for shorter measurement periods are still close, but
are far noisier: for short measurement periods, the absolute differ-
ence is small (≈4 for t = 82µs), increasing quantization errors, and
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Figure 9: Relative frequency changes ∆RC with 99% confidence intervals as a function of the transmitter and receiver lengths
for different FPGA generations. The count difference is proportional to the overlap between the transmitter and the receiver.
making it harder to distinguish between signal and noise. These
results indicate that for a given receiver/transmitter placement, the
absolute magnitude of the effect depends solely on measurement
time, with longer measurement periods making it easier to distin-
guish between signals and noise. An adversary can thus choose the
measurement time, trading throughput for lower bit error rate.
7.2 Wire Length
We also characterize the effect of varying the length (number) of
transmitter and receiver wires vt and vr in three generations of
devices. Besides the Virtex 5 device we have been using so far, we
also measure the effect on a Virtex 6 ML605 and on an Artix 7 Nexys
4. The relative change in frequency ∆RC is shown for different
combinations ofvt andvr in Figure 9, for one device per generation.
We notice the same common pattern for all 3 generations of devices.
For a given number of long wires vr used by the ring oscillator,
there are 3 distinct segments for ∆RC as the number of transmitter
longs vt increases. The first segment occurs for transmitters which
use only parts of a long. Using partial wires is possible because
even though VLONGs can only be driven from the top or the bottom,
they have additional intermediate “taps” which can be used to read
the values of the signal they carry. In practice, using partial wires
does not have an effect on the strength of the phenomenon: ∆RC
remains constant for all fractions of a long. This result is to be
expected since, electrically, the entire long wire is driven even if
the output tap does not take full advantage of its length.
The second segment is the region where vt ≤ vr . Here, ∆RC
increases linearly with vt , suggesting that the phenomenon affects
the delay of each long wire equally. The final region consists of
vt > vr , where ∆RC remains constant. The reason for this pattern
is that there is no additional overlap between the newly added
segments of the transmitter and the receiver.
We also identify the effect of a given number of transmitter
wires vt on receivers using a different number of longs vr . Among
receivers with vr ≥ vt , a smaller vr results in a larger effect. As
an example, for vt = 3, the effect for vr = 5 is smaller than it
is for vr = 3. This behavior is due to the transmitter affecting
only the first vt out of vr long wire segments of the ring oscillator.
For smaller ring oscillators, these vt segments represent a larger
portion of the number of wires used, and hence of overall delay.
The opposite is true when vr ≤ vt : the larger the RO, the bigger
the resulting effect. For instance, for vt = 4, the effect for vr = 3
is larger than the effect for vr = 1. This difference exists because
even though the delay of the routing scales linearly, the delay
associated with the inverter and buffer LUT stages remains constant.
Thus, the routing delay represents a larger fraction of the overall
delay (routing delay plus stage delay) for larger ROs. Since this
phenomenon only acts on routing delay, larger ROs are affected
more than shorter ones.
8 LOCATION INDEPENDENCE
In order to validate the location independence of the channel, we
test three different aspects of the placement of the receiver and
transmitter on: the absolute location on the device, the relative offset
of the receiver and transmitter, as well as the direction of signal
propagation. Figure 10 shows the results for all three experiments on
the Virtex 5 devices, with 99% confidence intervals. At a high level,
the effect remains approximately constant for each device regardless
of the choice of parameters. Across devices, the absolute magnitude
of the effect varies slightly, but is otherwise almost the same. Any
variability across devices is to be expected, since manufacturing
variations are known to affect ring oscillator frequencies [9].
Figure 10a shows the results when an identical circuit is placed
on different locations of the device: the four corners (bottom/top
left/right) and the center. Both transmitter and receiver use 2 longs
each, and they are adjacent: when the receiver’s location is (xr ,yr ),
the transmitter’s location is (xt ,yt ) = (xr ,yr − 1). Within a device,
the values are close, and there is no pattern in how the values change
between devices. Manufacturing variations within and between
devices can thus explain any variability.
The second experiment investigates the effect of the placement
of the receiver and the transmitter relative to each other. When the
receiver and transmitter have different lengths, it is possible for
the two circuits to have the same overlap, but a different starting
offset. This relative offset or (visually shown in Figure 11) also has
minimal effect on the channel. To test this hypothesis, we place a
transmitter made up of 5 longs at a fixed location on the device. The
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Figure 10: Effect of location on the relative frequency of oscillation, with 99% confidence intervals for different placements of
the circuit on the device. Absolute location, offset, and signal orientation have little influence on the magnitude of the effect.
Figure 11: Relative placement of longs for transmitter and
receiver, with respect to distance d and receiver offset or .
receiver, which uses 2 longs, is placed adjacent to the transmitter,
but at an offset of or full long wires, allowing for four different
offset placements. This offset needs to correspond to full long wire
lengths due to constraints imposed by the routing architecture of
the device. Any other offset would increase the distance d between
the transmitter and receiver, which we investigate separately in
Section 9. Figure 10b presents the results of this experiment, which
show approximately the same consistency both within and between
devices as those of the previous experiment.
Note that the relative effect of placing the receiver at various
offsets forms a consistent pattern across devices. As an example,
the effect for an offset or = 3 is consistently stronger than it is for
or = 1. This pattern can be explained by the FPGA routing layout: as
mentioned in Section 2, the local routing used to get to the various
long wire segments is different between each test. Because the local
routing resources differ, the ratio between the delay incurred by
the long wire segments and the local routing resources changes.
As will be discussed in Section 9, while the delay of the long wire
segments is affected by the transmitter, the local routing is not.
Using the same setup, and with an offset of or = 2 full long wires,
we change the direction of signal propagation for the transmitter
and receiver. In the previous experiments, both signals travelled
from the bottom of the device to the top. However, in the Virtex
5 architecture, VLONG wires are bi-directional, and can thus propa-
gate signals upwards or downwards. Figure 10c shows the results
for the 4 different orientations (receiver and transmitter down, re-
ceiver down/transmitter up, etc.). The relative count difference is
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Figure 12: Effect of the transmitter-receiver distance. Long
wires leak information up to two wires away. Distance is de-
fined as in Figure 11.
approximately the same for all configurations, although as with
the previous experiment, we notice a consistent ordering for the
four transmission directions across devices. Similar to the earlier
experiment, this pattern can also be explained by the routing layout.
The results of this section illustrate that only the long wires need
to bemanually specified, while the registers, LUTs, and local routing
can be auto-placed/routed, further reducing the attack complexity.
9 RESILIENCE TO COUNTERMEASURES
Although we discuss defense mechanisms in more depth in Sec-
tion 11, in this section we evaluate how close to the transmitter
a receiver would have to be in order to decode a message. We do
this by varying the distance d (depicted in Figure 11) between the
transmitter and the receiver. The results are shown in Figure 12.
We see that the phenomenon is still measurable when separating
the wires by a distance of d = 2, but the effect is 20 times weaker.
When the wires are farther apart (d ≥ 3), there is no correlation
between the transmitted and received values, i.e., the data comes
from the same distribution according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test (p > 0.75). In other words, any defensive monitoring must be
routed within a distance of two to detect a transmission through
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Figure 13: Effect of activity induced by adders and LFSRs at
different clock frequencies. The additional activity has very
little impact on channel quality.
the channel, and occupy all 4 wires adjacent to a signal in order to
prevent a channel from operating successfully.
To test whether an active protection mechanism can disrupt
the channel through additional dynamic activity on the device,
we measure the strength of the channel in the presence of large,
competing circuits which are both in- and out-of-sync with respect
to the transmissions. We synthesize 2 large 4096-bit adders, adding
different parts of a bitstream produced by a Linear Feedback Shift
Register (LFSR). As a result, both the addends and the sums change
every time the LFSR produces a new bit. The bits of each sum
are then XORed together and drive 2 LEDs for additional current
draw. We run the experiment on two Artix 7 Nexys 4 boards, for a
transmitter and receiver using 10 longs each.
In order to test transmission and reception under surrounding
activity of different switching frequencies, we vary how often the
LFSR produces new values by dividing the clock driving it by 2m ,
for m ∈ {1, 7, 15, 20, 24}, giving us frequencies of 5Hz – 50MHz.
The results for the two devices, including the base case of no adders
and LFSRs, are summarized in Figure 13, showing that additional
activity cannot disrupt the transmissions. However, we note some
correlation between the frequency of the activity and the corre-
sponding count difference. The resulting change is not sufficient
to hinder transmission, but can be used by the adversary to detect
the level of activity on the device, a technique already used by
Hardware Trojan detectors [12, 35].
10 EXPLOITING THE LEAKAGE
In this section we discuss exploiting the information leakage from
a theoretical perspective. In some cases (such as that of Figure 2), a
threshold is sufficient for distinguishing between 0s and 1s, but in
other setups (such as that of Figure 5), this separation might not
be as clear: the RO frequency may drift due to changes in environ-
mental conditions, such as temperature and voltage variation. We
first detail an encoding scheme that enables high-bandwidth covert
transmissions (Section 10.1), and then explain how to eavesdrop on
dynamic signals through repeated measurements (Section 10.2).
10.1 Covert Transmissions
To overcome the hurdle posed by local fluctuations, we propose
a Manchester encoding scheme, where 0s are transmitted as the
pair (0, 1), and 1s as the pair (1, 0). Since every pair contains each
bit once, one can decode the received pair (c0, c1) as a 0 if c0 < c1
and as a 1 otherwise. Using this scheme, transmissions lasting 82µs
using 2 longs as well as transmissions lasting 21ms using 13 of a
long are both recovered with accuracies of 99.0 – 99.9%, without
employing any error correction algorithms. Under this encoding
scheme, the bandwidth of the channel is 1/(2 · 82 · 10−6) = 6.1kbps.
To further distinguish between noise and legitimate transmis-
sions, we can introduce N -bit start- and end-of-frame patterns.
Assuming that the probability that c0 < c1 when no transmission is
taking place is 1/2 (i.e., each measurement is equally likely to be in-
terpreted as a 0 or a 1), then the probability that noise is interpreted
as a start-of-frame when no transmission is taking place is 2−N .
As the channel is resilient to noise (also see Section 9), noise will
not accidentally end a transmission early or introduce additional
errors while a transmission is taking place. N can thus be chosen
based on the desired application guarantees, which can include
additional checksums for error detection and correction. In partic-
ular, line codes such as 8b/10b provide single-bit error-detection
capabilities, and aid in clock recovery, making them ideal for such
an application. The bandwidth of the channel is then reduced to
6.1 × 8/10 ≈ 4.9kbps.
10.2 Signal Exfiltration
If an adversary is merely eavesdropping on nearby signals, it is
unlikely that they will remain constant throughout the period of
measurement. However, as shown in Section 6.2 (Figure 6), the delay
of the long wire depends only on the proportion of time for which
the nearby wire is carrying a 1, and not its switching frequency.
This fact reveals the Hamming Weight of the transmission during
the measurement period. By repeating measurements with a slid-
ing window, an eavesdropping adversary can fully recover nearby
dynamic signals such as cryptographic keys with high probability.
Suppose the adversary wishes to recover an N -bit key K , and
assume that in one period of measurement, the long wire carries
w consecutive bits of the key. We assume initially that N = nw is
an integer multiple of the measuring windoww , and explain how
to remove this assumption in Appendix A. By making repeated
measurements of different but overlapping windows, as shown in
Figure 14, the adversary can recover the key with high probability.
Specifically, assume the Hamming weight (measured by the RO
count) of the first w key bits K0 to Kw−1 (windowW0) is c0, and
that the Hamming weight of bits K1 through Kw (windowW1) is
c1. Then, if c0 ≈ c1 (within some device-dependent tolerance), we
can conclude that K0 = Kw . If c0 > c1 then K0 = 1 and Kw = 0,
while if c0 < c1 then K0 = 0 and Kw = 1. By comparing the next
count c2 to c1, one can determine the values of K1 and Kw+1, and,
more generally, by repeating this process, one can determine the
relationship between Ki and Ki+w .
Assuming a randomly generated key, the probability that Ki =
Kj for i , j is 1/2. The probability that all of Sr = (Kr , Kw+r , . . . ,
K(n−1)w+r ) are equal is 1/2n−1, since there are n−1 such pairs. The
probability that at least one of the bits in Sr is different than the
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Figure 14: A sliding window of width w can determine the
relationship between key bits Ki and Ki+w .
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Figure 15: Probability of recovering all N bits of a key based
on the window sizew . Smaller window sizes and longer keys
yield a better chance to fully recover the key.
rest is thus 1− 1/2n−1. If at least one is different, we can recover all
of these bits. Repeating this argument for all possible remainders
0 ≤ r < w , the probability of recovering the entire key is
P =
(
1 − 1
2n−1
)w
≥ 1 − w
2n−1
(2)
by Bernoulli’s inequality. Even if it might appear counter intuitive,
the expression shows that longer keys are easier to recover than
short keys. A larger window sizew relative to the key length makes
recovering the key harder as there are fewer measurements over
the length of the key. For the same reason, a longer key will increase
the recovery probability. This means that asymmetric keys, e.g.,
those used for signature verification are relatively easy to recover,
as they are typically much longer than symmetric keys.
Figure 15 shows the probability of successfully recovering all N
bits of a key as a function of the window sizew . A window of 10
bits can fully recover a key of size 64 with 78% probability, while
a 30-bit window can recover a 264-bit key with 87% probability.
Figure 15 only shows the probability for full recovery, i.e., if all
but one bit is recovered we still consider it a failure. However, the
above procedure can still reveal a lot about the key, even when it
does not recover it fully: in the worst case (if the entire key consists
of a repetition of its firstw bits), our approach reduces the guessing
space from 2N to 2w possibilities.
Extending the procedure to use multiple window lengths, we
can recover any key pattern with probability 1, except for when all
key bits are the same (i.e., all ones or all zeroes). This full recovery
can be achieved using a total of just 2w + 1 full passes over the key.
Appendix A gives an expression for the exact probability of full key
recovery for both single and multiple window sizes.
11 DISCUSSION
We structure our discussion in three parts: the channel itself (Sec-
tion 11.1), the cause of the information leakage (Section 11.2), and
potential defenses (Section 11.3).
11.1 The Channel
The channel characterized in the previous sections does not require
any modifications to the device or special tooling, allowing an
adversary to distribute it as IP blocks. The only routing that needs
to be specified is the use of the long wires, and the only placement
constraint is that the receiver and transmitter longs are adjacent.
The channel requires very little logic: the entire setup including the
signal generation and measurement portions uses just 71 lookup
tables (LUTs) and 66 registers, excluding resources taken up by
ChipScope to transfer the measurements to a PC for analysis. As an
example, our channel would only use 0.2% of the 33,000 LUTs used
in the open-source N200/N210 Universal Software Radio Peripheral
(USRP) software-defined radio project [25].
The USRP source codebase [26] illustrates how IP from different
organizations makes it into a project: USRP uses code from Ettus
Research, Xilinx, Easics NV, and OpenCores (written by different
authors). Since third-party code is a necessity, and as modern IP
blocks can be quite large, the potential for unintended interaction
between different cores increases. An adversary can exploit the
routing algorithms, which are forced to route through otherwise
monolithic black-box IPs due to resource constraints, enabling his
blocks to communicate covertly or eavesdrop on nearby signals.
As ring oscillators have legitimate uses, from thermal and de-
vice health monitors [6, 36] to Hardware Trojan detectors [12, 35],
TRNGs [33], and PUFs [20], the adversary can make dual-use trans-
mitters and receivers. The channel we identify exists whether trans-
missions are intentional or not, and is a threat when an adversary
controls one or more IP cores. Unintentional transmissions pose
new risks for multi-user scenarios, including FPGA/CPU hybrids
and cloud infrastructures offering FPGA solutions. In these setups,
an adversarial receiver can be placed next to long wires used by
other third-party vendors and eavesdrop on the signals carried by
them. The samemechanism can also be used for legitimate purposes
such as watermarks and no-contact debugging taps.
11.2 Leakage Cause
So far, we have focused on the novelty and applicability of the
phenomenon presented, rather than its cause. In Section 6.3, we
showed that the phenomenon depends on the use of the long wires,
and not the switching activity of circuits, which decreases rather
than increases ring oscillator frequency. The only other work which
deals with long wires delays is [8], where a RO with a long wire was
placed next to other long wires carrying signals which where either
equal to the RO signal or opposing it. It was shown that when a
nearby long wire has the same value as the RO wire, the frequency
of the RO is higher compared to the RO frequency when the nearby
long wire has the opposite value (i.e., if the current value on the
RO long wire is a 1, the value on the nearby wire is 0 and vice
versa). The work in [8] necessitates that the signal of the RO and
the nearby wire be in sync, so the wires were directly connected,
and static patterns which are independent of the RO signal were not
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tested. By contrast, in our work, we showed that nearby wires are
influenced even when there is no connection between the transmit-
ter and the receiver, and even when the transmitted value remains
constant during the measurement period. These two properties can
be exploited in constructing a communication channel.
Although [8] broadly categorized their observations as “capaci-
tive crosstalk”, it made no attempt to precisely determine the phys-
ical cause behind it. This would indeed be difficult without design
information such as physical layout and process-specific parame-
ters. This “lack of electrical detail” on FPGAs is, in fact, well-known
and has been identified by multiple authors [1, 2, 24, 30, 34].
As a result, whether the effect we have found exists due to drive-
strength issues, electromagnetic emissions, or some other property
of FPGAs remains an open question. It is even possible that the
wires themselves might not be the cause of the issue, but that the
buffers driving them share local connections to the power network.
However, without more specialized equipment to x-ray the chips
to further narrow down the potential causes, we cannot determine
the precise cause, or even whether ASICs would be affected.
Overall, the characterization of the channel is valuable even
without access to these details, since we have shown it to always be
present and easily measurable on off-the-shelf devices without spe-
cial modifications. FPGA users cannot alter the electrical behavior
of the device, but can only influence how circuits are mapped onto
the FPGA. As a result, FPGA circuit designers cannot change the ex-
istence of the channel, and need to be aware of the communication
and exfiltration capabilities that this channel introduces.
11.3 Defense Mechanisms
Section 9 showed that one cannot detect transmissions from a
distance d ≥ 2, and that spurious activity (in the form of adders
and additional current draw) does not eliminate the transmission
channel. Hence, defensemechanisms need to protect a design before
it is loaded onto the FPGA. Since long wires are an integral part
of the reconfigurable FPGA fabric, detecting the transmitter is not
easy: the long can be used as part of the connections within an
IP block, carrying sensitive information. Routing algorithms thus
need to be modified to account for this information leakage, by
introducing directives which mark signals, or even entire blocks
as sensitive. The tools then need to add “guard wires”, by either
leaving the four nearby long wires unoccupied, or by occupying
them with compiler-generated random signals. We note that even
though this approach will prevent the leakage from occurring, it is
particularly taxing for dense designs, and can make placement and
routing more time-consuming, or even lead to timing violations.
Designers using unpatched tools need to be aware of this source
of leakage, and must either manually look for long-wires post-
routing, explicitly add guard wires, or, more generally, specify place-
ment and routing constraints for both highly-sensitive signals, and
untrusted third-party blocks. Overall, better defense mechanisms
for future FPGA generations are needed at the architectural level,
and require a deeper understanding of the cause of this phenome-
non.
12 RELATEDWORK
Research on side- and covert-channels on FPGAs and other embed-
ded devices has primarily focused on communications between the
device and the outside world. Techniques include varying the power
consumption of a device and measuring the impulse response [37],
changing how much Electromagnetic Interference is emitted by the
device [3], or, in the other direction of communication, measuring
voltage [27] and temperature changes [31]. These side-channels can
be employed in the context of creating Hardware Trojans (HTs) [19],
or as ways to watermark circuits and offer IP protection [5, 27].
Many of these circuits employ ring oscillators, exploiting their
dependence on Process, Voltage, and Temperature (PVT) varia-
tions [9]. ROs are primarily used on the receiving end, but they
can also be used to transmit information by causing changes in
temperature [11]. This technique allows communications between
blocks on the same device, under a threat model similar to ours.
Ring oscillators have also been used in security-sensitive appli-
cations, including True Random Number Generators (TRNGs) [33]
and Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [20]. Consequently,
any mechanism which can be used to manipulate or bias their fre-
quency can also be used to attack these applications. Besides the
technique introduced in this paper, prior work has influenced the
delays of ROs by altering the power supply [21] and by injecting
EM signals [4], resulting in low entropy and cloneability.
As explained in Section 11.2, a switching pattern in sync with
the RO’s signal increases the RO’s oscillation frequency by 1-9%
compared to a pattern that opposes it [8]. To achieve this synchro-
nization, however, requires the transmitter to be connected to the
output of one of the RO’s stages. As a result, as presented, this
mechanism cannot be used directly for side-channel communica-
tion or to reliably attack the ring oscillator, due to the high accuracy
of prediction required for the frequency and phase of the oscillator.
Emphasis has also been placed on using networks of ROs to
detect Hardware Trojans on a device [12, 35]. The dynamic power
consumed by HTs results in a voltage drop that lowers the RO fre-
quencies compared to those in the Trojan-free “golden” IC, making
them detectable. Such prior work depends on the effect switch-
ing activity has on the frequency of ROs to detect HTs. As shown
in Figure 7, when using short wires, we were able to reproduce
the prior effect, where only the number of bit transitions, and not
the actual bits themselves, were the cause for the RO frequency
drop. However, this no longer holds for long wires: the frequency
increases based on the duration for which a 1 is transmitted, irre-
spective of the dynamic activity. As a result, the channel depends
on a fundamentally different phenomenon, which uses the values
carried on the wires themselves, and not their transitions.
Prior work [23] has shown that to detect slowly-changing sig-
nals, very large circuits (over 14k registers) or long measurement
times (2.5h) are needed, in addition to external measurement equip-
ment, and special modifications to the device. By contrast, our work
only uses small on-chip circuits, without any special control over
voltage or temperature conditions. We can distinguish between the
values of signals which remain constant (i.e., have no switching
activity) during our period of measurement, which is as low as 82µs,
a measurement period which is also a lower bound for on-chip HT
detection using ROs [18].
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13 CONCLUSION
We demonstrated the existence of a previously unexplored phe-
nomenon on FPGA devices, that causes the delay of so called “long
wires” to depend on the logical state of nearby long wires, even
when the driven value remains constant. The effect is small, but
surprisingly resilient, and measurable within the device by small
circuits even in the presence of environmental noise, and without
any modifications to the FPGA. We use this phenomenon to create
a communication channel between circuits that are not physically
connected. As designs often incorporate circuits from multiple
third-parties, this channel can break separation of privilege be-
tween IP cores of different trust levels, or enable communication
between distinct cores in multi-user setups. Such use-cases are in-
creasingly common as FPGAs and CPUs become integrated, and as
FPGAs become available on public cloud infrastructures. The same
mechanism can also be used to eavesdrop and recover keys with
high probability even when the signals change during the period
of measurement, or to implement a no-contact debugging tap or
watermark scheme. In our prototype implementation, the channel
has a bandwidth of up to 6kbps, and we can recover over 99% of
the transmitted bits correctly using a Manchester encoding scheme.
We showed that the phenomenon is present in three generations
of Xilinx FPGAs, and that the channel can be implemented in a
variety of arrangements, including different locations, orientations,
and with multiple transmitting circuits present. The strength of the
phenomenon scales linearly with the number of wires used, and
also dominates a competing effect caused by switching activity.
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A GENERALIZING SIGNAL EXFILTRATION
In this section we explain how to remove the assumption that the
key size N is a multiple of the window size w , and how to fully
recover keys by varying the window size.
To start with, if N = nw +m, with 0 ≤ m < w , the probability
that the bits in Sr =
(
Kr , Kw+r , K2w+r , . . .
)
are the same is 1/2n
for 0 ≤ r < m, since |Sr | = n + 1. Form ≤ r < w this probability is
1/2n−1, as |Sr | = n. This allows us to adjust Equation (2) to
P =
(
1 − 12n
)m (
1 − 1
2n−1
)w−m
(3)
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In particular, if N is a multiple of w , then m = 0, so the above
expression reduces to (2).
The expression is valid for any length N ≥ 2w − 1, removing the
requirement that N is an integer multiple ofw . The lower bound
on N is necessary if we wish to recover the firstw bits of the key,
as we need to have r +w ≤ N for each r with 0 ≤ r ≤ w − 1 in
order to have elements in Sr .
Suppose that the original measurements were not able to re-
cover the bits in Sr because they were all identical. By repeating
measurements with a window of sizew + 1, the algorithm either
recovers all bits in the sequence S ′r =
(
Kr , Kw+1+r , K2(w+1)+r , . . .
)
or shows that they too are identical (here, under the assumption
that N ≥ 2w + 1).
In the first case, the algorithm recovers Kr , and hence Sr since
all its bits are identical. In the second case, where all bits in S ′r are
also identical, the entire key consists of a single repeated bit (i.e., all
ones or all zeroes). This is because Kr = Kw+1+r = Kr+1 (mod w ),
and Kr = K2(w+1)+r = Kr+2 (mod w ), etc. Note that the size of S ′r
might be too small to cover the all the residues modw by itself, but
varying r allows us to recover all ofK0, . . . ,Kw−1 with probability 1
if there are at least 2 different bits in the key, or to determine that
the key consists of the same repeated bit.
For a window of sizew , we needN −w+1measurements, but this
can be accomplished in onlyw independent runs of the experiment.
Run r is responsible for collecting the measurements for the parts
of the key that start with Kr+w ·i for some i . For example, run 1
measures the Hamming weight of the key bits
(
K1, . . . ,Kw
)
, and(
Kw+1, . . . ,K2w
)
, etc. As there is no overlap in the bits used, these
measurements can be completed in a single run. Thus, using both
window sizes, and to fully determine all the bits of a key, one needs
to take
(N −w + 1) + (N − (w + 1) + 1) = 2N − 2w + 1
measurements over just
w + (w + 1) = 2w + 1
runs, showing that this key-recovery algorithm is efficient. In other
words, the key only needs to be repeated 2w + 1 times to be fully
leaked.
